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Abstract
The misalignment of the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP), the latest 
iteration in the development of the Eurosystem’s unconventional measures of mon-
etary policy, with EU environmental global commitments has stirred a lot of political 
debate in recent months. Critics of the CSPP typically point to Art. 3 TEU and to the 
binding nature of the Paris Agreement on the ECB as the main sources of legal obli-
gations for the Eurosystem. This essay puts forward an additional argument: the 
Eurosystem is bound by Art. 11 TFEU, which integrates environmental objectives 
into the mandate of the Eurosystem and requires it to take those objectives into 
account when designing and implementing monetary policy. On this basis, the essay 
provides a critical analysis of the validity of the controversial CSPP and explores the 
potential implications of Art. 11 TFEU for monetary policy. The essay concludes that, 
besides a distinctive source of legal obligations, Art. 11 TFEU represents an oppor-
tunity for the Eurosystem to contribute to improving our embryonic understanding 
of the relationship between climate change and financial stability.
Keywords
monetary policy, Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP), climate change, 
Eurosystem, ECB, principle of integration.
I. Introduction
On 9 December 2016, The Guardian reported on an analysis by Corporate Europe 
Observatory, a non-profit research group, that revealed that the Eurosystem, i.e. the 
central banking system of the euro area,1 was purchasing bonds issued by corporations 
* Lecturer in Commercial Law, University of Glasgow. This essay has benefited from comments 
received on earlier versions that I presented at the “Law, Finance and Sustainability” Conference, 
organised by the School of Law at the University of Sheffield in September 2017, and at a seminar at 
the University of Oslo held in April 2018. I would also like to thank Rosa Greaves, David Ramos, Iain 
MacNeil, Beate Sjåfjell, Emanuele Campiglio, Luna Romo, and José Manuel Marqués for their useful 
comments and feedback. All errors are my own.
1 The Eurosystem comprises the European Central Bank (“ECB”) and the national central banks 
(“NCBs”) of the Member States whose currency is the euro. The European System of Central Banks 
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in the oil, gas and automotive industries as part of its Corporate Sector Purchase Pro-
gramme (“CSPP”), the latest iteration of the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme 
(“APP”).2 The revelation came less than a year after the EU had signed the Paris 
Agreement and questioned the Union’s commitment towards environmental protec-
tion and climate change.3
The revelation stirred an intense political debate. Only a few days after the revela-
tion, four Members of the European Parliament (“MEPs”) addressed an open letter 
to Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (“ECB”),4 citing the 
Corporate Europe Observatory report and requesting that the ECB aligned the CSPP 
with the EU’s environmental global commitments.5 Pressure from MEPs started to 
grow thereafter. Since the revelation, several members of the European Parliament 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (“ECON”) have quizzed Mr Draghi 
on various occasions on the misalignment of the CSPP with the EU’s environmental 
global commitments and on the role of the ECB in promoting environmental protec-
tion.6
To these questions, Mr Draghi provided rotund answers: environmental protection 
falls out of the scope of the ECB’s mandate to promote price stability; it is a political 
matter and the ECB will support it just as other aims of the EU laid down in Art. 3 of 
the Treaty of the European Union (“TEU”) as long as it does not contravene the ECB’s 
mandate to maintain price stability.7
This essay challenges the narrow construction of the ECB’s mandate that Mr 
Draghi has defended in several occasions since the launch of the CSPP. The essay 
(“ESCB”) comprises the ECB and the NCBs of all EU Member States whether they have adopted the 
euro or not. The Eurosystem is responsible for EU monetary policy. See Art. 282(1) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). See also Art. 1.1° of the Statute of the ESCB and 
the ECB (the “Statute”). 
2 See Arthur Neslen, ‘ECB’s Quantitative Easing Programme Investing Billions in Fossil Fuels’ 
The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/09/ecbs-quantitative-easing-
programme-investing-billions-in-fossil-fuels> (accessed 15 April 2019). See also Corporate Europe 
Observatory, ‘The ECB’s “Quantitative Easing” Funds Multinationals and Climate Change’ <https://
corporateeurope.org/en/economy-finance/2016/12/ecb-quantitative-easing-funds-multinationals-and-cli-
mate-change> (accessed 15 April 2019).
3 The EU signed the Paris Agreement on 22 April 2016. See United Nations, Paris Agreement 
– Status of Ratification <http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php> (accessed 15 April 2019). 
4 The President of the ECB also chairs the Governing Council of the ECB, which comprises the 
members of the Executive Board of the ECB and the governors of the NCBs of the Member States 
whose currency is the euro. See Art. 10.1 Statute. The Governing Council coordinates the CSPP, which 
is implemented by several NCBs. See n 22.
5 See Reinhard Bütikofer and others, ‘Letter to Mr Mario Draghi, President of the ECB’ (16 
December 2016).
6 See e.g. the transcripts of the Monetary Dialogues celebrated on 29 May 2017, 25 September 
2017, 26 February 2018, 9 July 2018, 24 September 2018, 26 November 2018 and 28 January 2019. 
All transcripts are available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue.
html>. See also the European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2019 on the ECB Annual Report 
2017 (2018/2101(INI)), para. 25.
7 See Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘Transcript of the Monetary Dialogue with 
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Held on 25 September 2017’, p 12.
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argues that, at a substantive level, the principle of integration laid down in Art. 11 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) incorporates envi-
ronmental policy objectives into the mandate of the ECB and the NCBs comprised 
in the Eurosystem, thereby giving them the power to contribute to environmental 
protection. It also argues that, at a procedural level, Art. 11 TFEU imposes upon these 
institutions an obligation to take into account environmental protection when design-
ing and implementing monetary policy. This procedural obligation is particularly 
important. As I will illustrate below, failure to comply with it could raise serious 
doubts about the validity of monetary policy measures.
The essay contributes to an incipient literature that explores the potential role for 
central banks to promote environmental protection.8 A large part of this literature is 
devoted to exploring the economic rationale of “green” central bank policies. Aca-
demics, however, have paid relatively less attention to the legal powers of central 
banks to engage in environmental protection. Some MEPs have argued that the ECB, 
as an EU institution, is bound by the Paris Agreement.9 Recently, this was acknowl-
edged by Mr Draghi himself.10 In addition, Mr Draghi has acknowledged that the 
ECB is bound to support the general economic policies and the aims of the Union, 
which include ‘the sustainable development of Europe’ and ‘a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of the environment’,11 but subject, always, to their 
primary objective of price stability.12 This essay presents an additional argument 
based on the principle of integration laid down in Art. 11 TFEU.13
8 For some of the earliest proposals for central banks to support environmental protection, see 
Andrew Sheng, Central Banks Can and Should Do Their Part in Funding Sustainability, CIGI Fixing 
Climate governance Series paper no. 1 (2015); François Villeroy de Galhau, Climate Change – the 
Financial Sector and Pathways to 2oC (30 November 2015) <https://www.bis.org/review/r151229f.htm> 
(accessed 15 April 2019). For more elaborate proposals, see Emanuele Campiglio, Beyond Carbon Pric-
ing: The Role of Banking and Monetary Policy in Financing the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy 
121 Ecological Economics (2016) 220; Matthias Kroll, Financing the 1.5oC Limit: How Central Banks 
Can Contribute to Climate Finance by Purchasing Perpetual and Non-Interest-Bearing Green Climate 
Bonds, Future Finance-Policy Brief 11/2016 (2016); Sini Matikainen, Emanuele Campiglio and Dimitri 
Zenghelis, The Climate Impact of Quantitative Easing, GRI Policy Brief (2017); Warwick J McKib-
bin and others, Climate Change and Monetary Policy: Dealing with Disruption, Brooking Policy Brief 
(2017); Josh Ryan-Collins and Frank Van Lerven, Central Banks, Climate Change and the Transition 
to a Low-Carbon Economy, New Economics Foundation (2017); Ulrich Volz, On the Role of Central 
Banks in Enhancing Green Finance, UNEP Inquiry Working Paper 17/01 (2017). 
9 See e.g. the question raised by MEP Molly Scott-Cato during the Monetary Dialogue held on 
25 September 2017. 
10 See Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘Transcript of the Monetary Dialogue with 
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB’, held on 26 February 2018’, p 15.
11 See Art. 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”).
12 See n 8. The governor of the Bank of France, Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, has made a similar 
acknowledgement. See Villeroy de Galhau (n 9). This obligation also binds the NCBs that comprise the 
Eurosystem. See Arts. 119(2) and 127(1) TFEU, and Art. 2 Statute.
13 An earlier draft of this essay was published on 25 July 2018 as a University of Oslo Faculty of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2018-23. Since then, the ECB has acknowledged that 
Art. 11 TFEU integrates environmental protection objectives into its mandate yet subject to its pri-
mary objective of maintaining price stability. See Benoît Cœuré, Monetary Policy and Climate Change 
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The essay proceeds as follows. It first introduces the CSPP. The essay then exam-
ines the obligation of the ECB and the NCBs that comprise the Eurosystem to inte-
grate objectives of environmental protection into the design and implementation of 
monetary policy in the Eurozone. It then builds on this analysis to provide a critical 
assessment of the validity of the CSPP and it concludes with an exploration of the 
practical implications for monetary policy.
II. The CSPP: A Controversial Programme
On 10 March 2016, the Governing Council of the ECB announced that it would 
expand its asset purchase programme (“APP”) by introducing a new Corporate Sec-
tor Purchase Programme (“CSPP”) as part of the single monetary policy and in pursuit 
of its price stability objective.14 When the CSPP was launched, the extended APP 
already included three other programmes: a third covered bond purchase programme 
(CBPP3), that started in October 2014, an asset-backed securities purchase pro-
gramme (ABSPP), that started in November 2014, and a public sector purchase pro-
gramme (PSPP), that started in March 2015. As of 12 April 2019, all these programmes 
remain in place.
On 1 June 2016, the ECB published the Decision that set the basic framework for 
the CSPP (the “CSPP Decision”).15 The first purchases under the programme began 
a few days later. Like other programmes within the APP, the CSPP aimed to address 
problems of a prolonged period of low inflation:
Alongside the targeted longer-term refi nancing operations […] these asset purchase 
programmes are aimed at further enhancing the transmission of monetary policy, 
facilitating credit provision to the euro area economy, easing borrowing condi-
tions for households and businesses and contributing to returning infl ation rates 
to levels below, but close to, 2 % over the medium term, consistent with the ECB’s 
primary objective of maintaining price stability.16
(8 November 2018) <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp181108.en.html> 
(accessed 15 April 2019). 
14 See European Central Bank, ECB Adds Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) to the 
Asset Purchase Programme (APP) and Announces Changes to APP (10 March 2016) <https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310_2.en.html> (accessed 15 April 2019).
15 See Decision (EU) 2016/948 of the European Central Bank of 1 June 2016 on the implemen-
tation of the corporate sector purchase programme (ECB/2016/16) (hereinafter, “CSPP Decision”), 
available at <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/celex_32016d0016_en_txt.pdf?0240957ff3a5d0b
909a9482628799777>. The CSPP Decision has been amended twice to introduce minor changes. These 
can be consulted at <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html#cspp>. Any 
references to the CSPP Decision will be to its amended version unless otherwise stated.
16 CSPP decision, para. 2 of the Preamble.
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Under the CSPP, the Eurosystem purchases eligible corporate bonds from eligible 
counterparties in the primary and secondary markets.17 In order to be eligible under 
the CSPP, corporate bonds must meet the general requirements laid down in Part Four 
of Guideline (EU) 2015/510 of the ECB of 19 December 2014 on the implementation 
of the Eurosystem monetary policy framework (ECB/2015/34) (hereinafter, the “Gen-
eral Documentation Guideline”),18 as well as a series of specific requirements enumer-
ated in Article 2 of the CSPP Decision. In general terms, this latter provision specifies 
that eligible corporate bonds must have a high credit quality,19 must have been issued 
by non-bank corporations established in the euro area, must be denominated in euros, 
and must have a remaining maturity between 6 months, and 30 years and 364 days at 
the time of purchase. Moreover, the Eurosystem will generally refrain from purchas-
ing more than 70% of a bond’s issue.20
The CSPP is implemented by the NCBs of six Member States21 yet coordinated by 
the ECB in order to safeguard the singleness of the Eurosystem´s monetary policy.22 
These six NCBs will typically enter into outright purchase transactions and then make 
the purchased corporate bonds available for lending.23 Nevertheless, the purchasing 
NCBs will only be able to enter into these transactions with eligible counterparties, 
as described in Article 6 of the CSPP Decision.24
On 13 December 2018, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to end the net 
purchases under the APP, including the CSPP.25 As of January 2019, the Eurosystem 
17 See Art. 1 CSPP Decision. “Public sector corporate bonds”, however, may only be purchased in 
the secondary markets under certain conditions. For a definition of “public sector corporate bonds” for 
the purposes of the CSPP, see Art. 3(1) CSPP Decision. Approximately 82.1% of securities held under 
the CSPP were secondary market holdings. See ECB, Asset Purchase Programmes <https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html> (accessed 15 April 2019).
18 See Art. 2.1° CSPP Decision.
19 The ECB’s press release announcing the details of the CSPP specified that ‘[eligible securities 
would] have a minimum first-best credit assessment of at least credit quality step 3 (rating of BBB- or 
equivalent) obtained from an external credit assessment institution according to [the General Docu-
mentation Guideline.]’ See European Central Bank, ECB Announces Details of the Corporate Sector 
Purchase Programme (CSPP) (21 April 2016) <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/
pr160421_1.en.html> (accessed 15 April 2019).
20 See Art. 4 CSPP Decision.
21 The six Member States are: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Purchases under 
the CSPP are allocated to each purchasing NCB according to the issuer’s country of incorporation. See 
Art. 5 CSPP Decision. For specific details about these criteria, see European Central Bank, Corporate 
sector purchase programme (CSPP) – Questions & Answers, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/imple-
ment/omt/html/cspp-qa.en.html> (accessed 15 April 2019).
22 See Preamble CSPP Decision, para. 9.
23 See Art. 7 CSPP Decision. 
24 In general terms, these will be counterparties that are eligible for the Eurosystem’s monetary 
policy operations or counterparties that are used by the Eurosystem for the investment of its euro-
denominated portfolios.
25 See European Central Bank, Monetary Policy Decisions (13 December 2018) <https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ecb.mp181213.en.html> (accessed 15 April 2019). Since its incep-
tion, the Eurosystem varied its monthly pace of purchases under the APP depending on the evolution of 
inflation. At its peak, between April 2016 and March 2017, monthly purchases amounted to €80 billion. 
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no longer conducts net purchases under the CSPP but it continues to reinvest the 
principal payments from maturing securities held in the CSPP portfolio. It intends to 
continue to do so ‘for an extended period of time past the date when it starts raising 
the key ECB interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favour-
able liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation.’26
At the end of December 2018, total holdings of securities purchased under the 
CSPP amounted to €178 billion, approximately 6.92% of all APP holdings.27 Chart 
1 summarises monthly net purchases under the APP and Chart 2 shows the evolution 
of purchases under the CSPP.
 
Chart 1. APP monthly net purchases by programme28
The effectiveness of the CSPP in raising inflation29 relies on the assumption that, by 
purchasing bonds issued by non-financial corporations, the programme would 
strengthen the financing conditions of the real economy, thereby leading to potential 
Since then, the Eurosystem has progressively reduced its monthly pace of purchases until ending net 
purchases completely in December 2018.
26 See Id.
27 At the end of December 2018, total holdings under the APP amounted to €2.57 trillion. Securi-
ties held under the PSPP, CBPP3 and ABSPP portfolios represented 81.8%, 12.47% and 1.07% of total 
holdings, respectively. See supra n 18. 
28 Source: ECB. See supra n 18.
29 Inflation is the rate at which the general level of prices of goods and services rises.
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increases in investment and consumption that would drive prices up.30 There is 
empirical evidence to support that the APP, and the CSPP in particular, has had a 
positive effect on the financing conditions of non-financial corporations.31 Evidence 
of such improvement in the financing conditions leading to a positive impact on eco-
nomic growth and inflation, however, is inconclusive.32 In this sense, the data that are 
30 See European Central Bank, Box 2. The ECB’s Corporate Sector Purchase Programme: Its 
Implementation and Impact 4 ECB Economic Bulletin Issue 40 (2017).
31 It is important to note, however, that the literature examining the effect of purchases of corporate 
bonds as a monetary policy measure is very scarce. On the effectiveness of the CBPP, implemented 
by the Eurosystem between July 2009 and June 2010, see John Beirne and others, The Impact of the 
Eurosystem’s Covered Bond Purchase Programme on the Primary and Secondary Markets, ECB Occa-
sional Paper Series No. 122 (2011). On the impact of similar programmes to the CSPP implemented by 
the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan, see Lena Boneva, Calebe de Roure and Ben Morely, The 
Impact of the Bank of England’s Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme on Yield Spreads, Bank of England 
Staff Working Paper No. 719 (2018); Kenji Suganuma and Yoichi Ueno, The Effects of the Bank of 
Japan’s Corporate and Government Bond Purchases on Credit Spreads, IMES Discussion Paper No. 
2018-E-4 (2018). I examine studies on the effect of the CSPP in greater detail below.
32 In a very recent study, the Eurosystem provided evidence to support that net asset purchases 
under the APP had been ‘an adaptable and effective instrument to ease monetary and financial condi-
tions, foster economic recovery, counteract disinflationary pressures and anchor inflation expectations, 
thereby supporting a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation towards price stability.’ See Felix 
Hammermann, Kieran Leonard, Stefano Nardelli and Julian von Landesberger, Taking Stock of the Euro-
system’s Asset Purchase Programme after the End of Net Asset Purchases 2 ECB Economic Bulletin 69 
(2019). In an equally recent study, however, researchers at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis cast doubt on the prevailing evidence that has been used to date to support the effectiveness of 
Chart 2. CSPP aggregate holdings (March 2019)
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currently available do not support the existence of a causal relationship between the 
APP and the observed levels of economic growth and inflation in the eurozone since 
the APP was launched. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this essay, the documented 
impact of the CSPP on the financing conditions of non-financial corporations can help 
us better understand the relationship between monetary policy and environmental 
protection. I turn my attention to this literature in the remainder of the section.
A recent study by economists at the Bank of Spain, one of the purchasing NCBs 
under the CSPP, has shown that the announcement of the CSPP reduced the yields 
on bonds issued by Spanish non-financial corporations that were eligible under the 
CSPP by 44 basis points.33,34 This fall improved the financing conditions of these 
corporations significantly: it represented 30% of the yield on these assets in the same 
period.35 The authors also point out that bonds issued by German, French and Italian 
non-financial corporations that were eligible under the CSPP also experienced sig-
nificant, yet lower, falls: 28, 37 and 42 basis points, respectively.36
The same study also documents an indirect effect on ineligible bonds. Yields in 
these assets dropped 46 basis points around the announcement of the CSPP, which 
represented 10% of their average value at that time.37
In an even more recent study, economists at the ECB observed similar effects on 
the yields of eligible and ineligible bonds across the eurozone.38 In addition, another 
recent study from the ECB has evidenced that the CSPP has had a positive effect in 
the financing conditions of non-financial corporations as a result of the reduction of 
corporate bond spreads since the announcement of the programme.39 However, anal-
yses of similar programmes implemented by the Bank of England and the Bank of 
Eurosystem’s balance sheet policies. See Adam Elbourne and Kan Ji, Do SVARs Identify Unconventional 
Monetary Policy Shocks?, CPB Discussion Paper (12 February 2019).
33 A reduction in the yield of a bond translates into more favourable financing conditions for the 
issuer of the bond. Basis points are another way of referring to percentages. 100 basis points equals 1%.
34 See Oscar Arce, Ricardo Gimeno and Sergio Mayordomo, The Effects of the Eurosystem’s Cor-
porate Sector Purchase Programme on Spanish Companies 1 Banco de España Economic Bulletin 1, 
2 (2018).
35 See Id.
36 See Id. 
37 See Id. The authors suggest that this may be the effect of investors seeking higher yields in the 
bond market. Nevertheless, Matikainen et al have argued that some ineligible assets may be imperfect 
substitutes for eligible assets under the CSPP, which reduces the potential indirect effect on the formers’ 
yields. Moreover, the relatively small size of the corporate bond market in the EU and the globalisation 
of financial markets may lead investors to shift their investments abroad. See Matikainen, Campiglio 
and Zenghelis, supra n 9 at 9.
38 See Nordine Abidi and Ixart Miquel-Flores, Who Benefits from the Corporate QE? A Regression 
Discontinuity Design Approach, ECB Working Paper Series No 2145 (2018). Using a sample of around 
1,300 bonds across 15 countries in the euro area, they illustrate that the announcement of the CSPP may 
have reduced bond yields through the liquidity channel and as a result of portfolio rebalancing effects. 
See also European Central Bank, Box 2 – The Corporate Bond Market and the ECB’s Corporate Sector 
Purchase Programme 5 Economic Bulletin Issue 20, 22-23 (2016). 
39 See Roberto A De Santis and others, The Impact of the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme 
on Corporate Bond Markets and the Financing of Euro Area Non-Financial Corporations 3 ECB Eco-
nomic Bulletin 66, 68-72 (2018).
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Japan cast some doubt on the reliability of credit spreads as indication of an improve-
ment in the financing conditions of non-financial corporations.40
According to the recent studies conducted at the Bank of Spain and the ECB, the 
announcement of the CSPP has also prompted non-financial corporations to increase 
their levels of bond finance.41 At least in the case of Spanish issuers, non-financial 
corporations with access to bond markets mainly used the funds raised in these favour-
able market conditions to reduce their bank credit, thereby modifying the structure 
of their liabilities.42
The Bank of Spain study also documents indirect effects on aggregate bank credit. 
According to this study, banks increased their lending to companies that did not 
have access to the bond market in order to compensate the reduction of credit 
that had resulted from the decisions of bond issuers to restructure their debt. In par-
ticular, banks increased their lending to large corporations, possibly in an attempt to 
preserve the banks’ risk profile.43 The authors suggest that these indirect effects on 
aggregate bank lending may have been driven, to a large extent, by targeted longer-
term refinancing operations (TLTROs).44 Unlike firms issuing bonds, firms that rely 
40 A recent study by the Bank of England has found the announcement of the homologue of the 
CSPP to have a very similar impact on credit spreads of eligible and ineligible bonds denominated in 
sterling, the difference being only between 2.2 and 5.3 basis points. When compared with credit spreads 
of ineligible bonds denominated in US dollars and euros, the announcement of the programme reduced 
credit spreads of eligible bonds by 13 to 14 basis points. See Boneva, de Roure and Morely supra n 32. 
Another study by economists at the ECB found the announcement of the CSPP to actually broaden 
spreads for eligible corporate bonds, thus undermining their liquidity, although they also document a 
reduction of these spreads once purchases started. See Abidi and Miquel-Flores supra n 39. A recent 
study by economists at the Bank of Japan on the effectiveness of the Japanese homologue of the CSPP 
has found the programme to have a considerable effect on corporate bond spreads, which is in line with 
the findings of the ECB. See Suganuma and Ueno supra n 32. The conclusions from these studies sug-
gest that the evidence on the positive impact of the CSPP and similar programmes on corporate bond 
spreads is, at least, ambiguous.
41 Arce and co-authors show that, in the six months that followed the announcement of the CSPP, 
the number of new issuers in the bond market doubled the number of new issuers in the six months 
that preceded the announcement. They also document an increase in the overall propensity of existing 
issuers to issue bonds. See Arce, Gimeno and Mayordomo supra n 35 at 2-3. A recent study by the ECB 
has observed similar effects in other Eurozone countries. See De Santis and others supra n 40 at 72-75.
42 See Arce, Gimeno and Mayordomo supra n 35 at 3.
43 More specifically, ‘on average, for each euro of decline in credit to firms that issued bonds fol-
lowing announcement of the CSPP, €0.48 were reallocated to large corporations, €0.15 to medium-sized 
firms and €0.15 to small and micro firms.’ Id. 3-4.
44 TLTROs are Eurosystem operations that provide banks with long-term funding at attractive con-
ditions ‘in order to further ease private sector credit conditions and stimulate bank lending to the 
real economy’. See European Central Bank, Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/tltro/html/index.en.html> (accessed 15 April 2019). 
The terms of the TLTRO-II, which was announced on the same date as the CSPP, specify that the 
interest rate that will be applied to banks under this programme will be a decreasing function of the 
volume of new credit that they grant. Arce et al estimate that a bank that had availed itself of TLTRO 
funds before the announcement of the CSPP would increase its lending to other firms 16% on average, 
while other banks would only do so by 8%. See Arce, Gimeno and Mayordomo supra n 35 at 4. De 
Santis and others also provide evidence of an increase in bank lending to CSPP-ineligible firms but 
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on bank lending used a considerable amount of the funds raised to finance real invest-
ments.45
On 9 December 2016, The Guardian reported on an analysis by Corporate Europe 
Observatory which revealed that some of the corporate bonds that the Eurosystem 
had purchased under the CSPP had been issued by corporations in the oil, gas and 
automotive industries.46 Although the precise effect of the CSPP on the financing 
conditions of eligible bonds was unknown at the time, the revelation stirred a politi-
cal debate that continues to this day.47 Today, however, the recent empirical studies 
of the effectiveness of the CSPP described above provide us with a better understand-
ing of the potential impact of the CSPP on the environment. In essence, non-financial 
corporations whose assets are eligible for purchase under the CSPP enjoy a greater 
improvement in their financing conditions than non-financial corporations whose 
assets are not eligible for purchase. At the time of writing, new data released by the 
ECB about the CSPP48 confirms that, as of the end of September 2017, 49% of eli-
gible bonds under the CSPP were in the utilities (17%), infrastructure (14%), automo-
tive (10%) and energy (8%) sectors.49 Corporations in these industries are among the 
largest emitters of CO2 and other greenhouse gases,50 which are one of the main driv-
ers of climate change.51 By reducing the cost of finance for these corporations, the 
CSPP is effectively facilitating and prolonging their contribution to climate change.
they acknowledge the difficulty of attributing this increase to the CSPP alone. See De Santis and oth-
ers supra n 40 at 75-78.
45 See Arce, Gimeno and Mayordomo supra n 35 at 4-5.
46 See supra n 3. A recent study has evidenced that the Bank of England has also bought bonds 
from corporations in the oil, gas and utilities industries under a programme of similar characteristics and 
with similar objectives to those of the CSPP, the Corporate Bond Purchase Programme. For a detailed 
analysis, see Matikainen, Campiglio and Zenghelis supra n 9 at 13-19.
47 See the Introduction to this essay.
48 See European Central Bank, Additional Information on Asset Purchase Programme <https://
www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ecb.pr171026.en.html> (accessed 15 April 2019).
49 See European Central Bank supra n 18. The same data reveal that the actual composition of 
the CSPP portfolio is very similar: 45% of the bonds held in the CSPP portfolio on the same date had 
been issued by corporations in the utilities (16%), infrastructure (12%), automotive (10%) and energy 
(7%) sectors. These data, however, do not provide information about holdings from individual issuers. 
A preliminary study by Battiston and Monasterolo confirms the bias of the CSPP portfolio towards 
carbon-intensive sectors. See Stefano Battiston and Irene Monasterolo, How Could the ECB’s Monetary 
Policy Support the Sustainable Finance Transition? (22 March 2019) <https://www.finexus.uzh.ch/en/
news/cspp_sustainable_finance.html> (accessed 15 April 2019). 
50 The world’s 250 largest publicly traded emitters are a group of businesses in the oil, gas, utility, 
automotive, aircraft, manufacturing, steel, mining and cement sectors. Together, these 250 companies 
are responsible for a third of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases. See David Lubin, John 
Moohead and Tim Nixon, Global 250 Greenhouse Gas Emitters – A New Business Logic, Thomson 
Reuters Financial & Risk White Paper (October 2017) at 2.
51 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (PCC), the leading international 
body for the assessment of climate change, over the last 15 years, among the well-mixed greenhouse 
gases, CO2 has been the dominant contributor to global warming. See Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, Fifth Assessment Report – The Physical Science Basis (2014) at 53.
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The indirect effect that the CSPP is having on climate change raises an evident 
question: is the Eurosystem bound by an obligation to protect the environment? So 
far, the attempts to bind the Eurosystem to such an obligation rely on two arguments: 
one, that the ECB is bound by the Paris Agreement as an EU institution;52 and two, 
that under Art. 3 TEU, the Eurosystem is bound to support the general economic 
policies and the aims of the Union, which include ‘the sustainable development of 
Europe’ and ‘a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment’,53 but subject, always, to its primary objective of price stability.54 This 
essay introduces an additional argument that relies on Art. 11 TFEU. Section III 
develops the argument, and Sections IV and V explore its potential implications for 
policy-making in the Eurosystem.
III. The Obligation of the ECB to Integrate Environmental Protection
According to Art. 11 TFEU, ‘Environmental protection requirements must be inte-
grated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, 
in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.’ This provision is 
said to consecrate a “principle of integration”.55 It has a long history, tracing its origins 
to the Single European Act, which introduced Article 130r(2) in the Treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1987. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
then made the principle of integration an independent general principle in Article 6 
of the Treaty of the European Community (EC), which preceded Art. 11 TFEU.56
The principle of integration has been described as a “horizontal” or a “cross-sec-
tional” clause that applies to all policies of the Union.57 This makes the principle of 
52 See supra nn. 10 and 11. The same argument could be made of the NCBs that comprise the 
Eurosystem and the ESCB because all EU Member States are signatories of, and have ratified, the Paris 
Agreement. See United Nations supra n 4.
53 See Art. 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
54 See supra n 8.
55 See David Langlet and Said Mahmoudi, EU Environmental Law and Policy, 41, 58-61 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2016). See also the Opinion of Advocate General (“AG”) Bot delivered on 8 
May 2013 in Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, Essent Belgium NV v. Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie 
voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, EU:C:2013:294, para. 97. 
56 The principle is also included in Art. 37 the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the “EU Char-
ter”) albeit with a more conservative yet more concrete wording. It reads: ‘A high level of environmental 
protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies 
of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.’
57 See e.g. Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-298/12, Confédération paysanne, EU:C:2013:319, 
para. 30. In relation to Art. 6 EC, the precursor of Art. 11 TFEU, see inter alia the Opinion of AG Geel-
hoed in Case C-161/04, Austria v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:66, para. 60, and his Opinion 
in Case C-178/03, Commission v. Parliament, EU:C:2005:312, para. 32. Such a broad interpretation of 
the scope of application of the principle of integration is grounded in the interpretation that the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) had made of Art. 130r(2) of the EC Treaty, the precursor of 
Art. 6 EC. See e.g. Case C-62/88, Greece v. Council, EU:C:1990:153, para. 20. The EU Treaties confer 
such horizontal nature to a few other matters besides environmental protection, e.g. gender equality, 
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integration binding on all relevant EU institutions as well as Member States respon-
sible for the advancement of the Union’s policies.58 In the words of Advocate General 
(“AG”) Jacobs, ‘[The principle of integration] is not merely programmatic; it imposes 
legal obligations.’59
The precise meaning of the word “integration” in Art. 11 TFEU, however, is open 
to interpretation. The EU Treaties do not provide any clarity as to the meaning of the 
term but the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has 
shed some light on its interpretation. The CJEU has consistently affirmed that “inte-
grating” environmental protection requirements in other Union policies and activities, 
as laid down in Art. 11 TFEU, means incorporating the objectives of the EU environ-
mental policy, which are laid down in Art. 191 TFEU, to the list of objectives that is 
specific to any given Union policy.60 The CJEU has confirmed this interpretation in 
relation to the common agricultural policy,61 the common transport policy,62 the 
internal market policy,63 and the common commercial policy,64 among others. There 
is no reason why the CJEU would not uphold a similar interpretation in relation to 
monetary policy.65
non-discrimination, and public health. See e.g. Opinion of AG Mazák in Case C-440/05, Commission 
v. Council, EU:C:2007:393, para. 96. This “horizontal dimension” stems from the social purpose of the 
EU project. See, by analogy, Case C-201/15, AGET Iraklis, EU:C:2016:972, para. 77.
58 See e.g. Beate Sjåfjell, The Legal Significance of Art. 11 TFEU for EU Institutions and Member 
States in Beate Sjåfjell and Anja Wiesbrock (eds), The Greening of European Business under EU Law: 
Taking Art. 11 TFEU Seriously (London: Routledge, 2017).
59 (Emphasis added.) Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra, EU:C:2000:585, 
para. 231. For other opinions supporting the characterisation of the principle of integration as a source of 
obligations, see Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-428/07, Horvath, EU:C:2009:47, para. 55, and Opin-
ion of AG Cosmas in Case C-321/95, Greenpeace council and others v. Commission, EU:C:1997:421, 
para. 62. Academic commentators have also adhered to this interpretation. See e.g. Martin Wasmeier, 
The Integration of Environmental Protection as a General Rule for Interpreting Community Law 38 
Common Market Law Review 159, 160 (2001); André Nollkaemper, Three Conceptions of the Inte-
gration Principle in International Environmental Law in Andrea Lenschow (ed), Environmental Policy 
Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe, 28-29 (London: Earthscan, 2002).
60 See e.g. the cases mentioned in nn. 62-65. According to Art. 191(1) TFEU, the EU environmental 
policy shall contribute to the following objectives: i) preserving, protecting and improving the quality 
of the environment, ii) protecting human health, iii) prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, 
and iv) promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems, and in particular combating climate change. In this sense, the principle of integration is a 
rule of reference rather than an autonomous principle, ie a rule with autonomous normative meaning. 
See Nollkaemper supra n 60 at 26-27.
61 See e.g. Case C-428/07, Horvath, EU:C:2009:458, para. 29, and those cited therein.
62 See e.g. Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2007:625, para. 60, and those cited 
therein.
63 See e.g. Case C-320/03, Commission v. Austria, EU:C:2005:684, para. 73, and the Opinion of 
AG Geelhoed in the same case, EU:C:2005:459, para. 105. The General Court has adopted the same 
interpretation in the context of the EU rules on State aid. See e.g. Case T-210/02, British Aggregates 
v. Commission, EU:T:2012:110, para. 117.
64 See e.g. Case C-62/88, Greece v. Council, EU:C:1990:153, paras 15-19, and Case C-281/01, 
Commission v. Council, EU:C:2002:761, paras 39-43. See also the Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case 
C-178/03, Commission v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:66, para. 32.
65 Art. 130 TFEU consecrates the independence of the ECB and the NCBs ‘from Union institu-
tions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body.’ 
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In this sense, the CJEU seems to attribute a “substantive” dimension to the prin-
ciple of integration: the principle will confer upon a given competent authority the 
power to promote horizontal objectives of environmental protection along the more 
specific objectives of a different Union policy.
Nevertheless, although the CJEU has emphasized the “fundamental nature” of 
horizontal objectives of environmental protection,66 it has also affirmed that such 
fundamental nature does not result in an absolute priority over more specific objec-
tives of other Union policies.67 An absolute priority of environmental protection 
would be untenable for several reasons. First, nothing in the wording of Art. 11 TFEU 
suggests such absolute priority.68 Second, Art. 3 TEU includes environmental protec-
tion as one of several aims of the Union. A priori, these goals are at the same level of 
normative priority and the principle of integration does not alter that.69 An absolute 
priority of environmental protection could actually jeopardise the efficacy of all the 
other aims enumerated in Art. 3 TEU.70 Lastly, an absolute priority would seem con-
trary to the very principle of “sustainable development”, which Art. 11 TFEU itself 
links to the principle of integration. Indeed, ‘[t]he core idea of “sustainable develop-
ment” is that environmental protection, economic growth and social development are 
mutually compatible, rather than conflicting, objectives.’71
But in addition to this substantive dimension, Art. 11 TFEU also encapsulates a 
“procedural” dimension. Indeed, Art. 11 TFEU is often described as a requirement 
The application of Art. 11 TFEU to the ECB and the NCBs in the Eurosystem, however, does not 
interfere with their independence. Its application does not result from instructions or guidance received 
from the political bodies enumerated in Art. 130 TFEU. It results from the exclusive competence that 
the ECB and the NCBS in the Eurosystem have over monetary policy. See Art. 127(2) TFEU. Other 
EU institutions whose independence from political powers is also protected under the Treaties, like the 
CJEU, are also subject to Art. 11 TFEU. See e.g. Sjåfjell supra n 59 at 62-64. The European Parlia-
ment has also argued that the ECB’s independence would not be affected by the binding nature of the 
Paris Agreement. See Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘Report on Sustainable Finance’ 
(2018) A8-0164/2018, para. 23.
66 See e.g. Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2005:542, para. 42.
67 Indeed, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has affirmed that the principle of integration ‘[is] 
intended to confer powers on the Community to undertake specific action on environmental matters, 
while leaving intact its powers under other provisions of the Treaty, even if the measures in question 
pursue at the same time one of the objectives of environmental protection (see Case C-405/92 Mondiet 
[1993] ECR I-6133, para. 26).’ C-336/00 Huber, EU:C:2002:509, para. 33. (Emphasis added.) See also 
Case C-62/88 Greece v. Council, EU:C:1990:153, paras 19 and 20.
68 The case law of the ECJ seems to support this interpretation. See supra n 67.
69 In support of this view, see Wasmeier supra n 60 at 163. In addition, the same normative prior-
ity would have to be predicated of other integration principles that have been introduced in the TFEU, 
thereby questioning the absolute priority of any one of them. Jans has described the erosion of the 
prominence of the environmental integration principle that results from the proliferation of other integra-
tion principles as the “minestrone effect”. See Jan H Jans, Stop the Integration Principle? 33 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1533, 1546-47 (2009).
70 See e.g. the Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-304/01, Spain v. Commission, EU:C:2003:619, 
paras 68-69.
71 (Emphasis omitted.) Andrea Lenschow, Greening the European Union: An Introduction in 
Andrea Lenschow (ed), Environmental Policy Integration: Greening Sectoral Policies in Europe, 5 
(London: Earthscan 2002) 5. See also Sjåfjell supra n 59 at 55.
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for competent authorities to “take into account”72 or to “consider”73 environmental 
objectives when designing and implementing common policies. For example, in his 
Opinion in case C-161/04, Austria v. Parliament and Council, AG Geelhoed inter-
preted the principle of integration ‘as an obligation on the part of the Community 
institutions to take due account of ecological interests in policy areas outside that of 
environmental protection stricto sensu.’74 In the same Opinion, AG Geelhoed provided 
a rather lenient standard of compliance with the procedural obligation to “take into 
account” environmental protection: ‘It is only where ecological interests manifestly 
have not been taken into account or where they have been completely disregarded 
that Article 6 EC may serve as the standard for reviewing the validity of Community 
legislation.’75
In Case T-229/04, Sweden v. Commission, however, the General Court (then the 
Court of First Instance) adopted a stricter standard of compliance: it annulled Com-
mission Directive 2003/112/EC because the Commission had failed to actively engage 
with the scientific studies that it had used to prepare the controversial Directive. The 
controversial Directive had included paraquat, an active substance used in plant pro-
tection products, in the list of authorized active substances under Annex I of Council 
Directive 91/414/EC of 15 July. The Commission had relied on an evaluation report 
that stated that there was no indication that paraquat was neurotoxic. Among other 
things, the Kingdom of Sweden argued that the evaluation report did not contain any 
assessment of the literature concerning possible links between paraquat and Parkin-
son’s disease.76 The General Court confirmed this allegation and concluded that the 
Commission’s evaluation report had not complied with the relevant procedural 
requirements. The Kingdom of Sweden further alleged that the Commission’s deci-
sion to adopt the controversial Directive had been based on a misinterpretation of 
several field studies and technical assessments that indicated the potential problems 
72 See e.g. the Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-298/12, Confédération paysanne, EU:C:2013:319, 
para. 30; the Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-204/12, Essent Belgium, EU:C:2013:294, para. 97; and the 
Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-161/04 Austria v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:66, para. 44. 
73 See e.g. the Opinion of AG Kokott in Joined Cases C-626/15 and C-659/16, European Commis-
sion v. Council of the European Union, EU:C:2018:362, para. 80.
74 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-161/04, Austria v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:66, 
para. 59. (Emphasis added.) See also the Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-304/01, Spain v. Commission, 
EU:C:2003:619, para. 69. In this latter case, the Court followed the Opinion of the AG but it framed 
the discussion exclusively in terms of non-discrimination. See Case C-304/01, Spain v. Commission, 
EU:C:2004:495, paras 39-43.
75 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in case C-161/04, Austria v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2006:66, 
para. 59. See also the Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-304/01, Spain v. Commission, EU:C:2003:619, 
para. 69. In this latter case, the Court followed the Opinion of the AG but it framed the discussion 
exclusively in terms of non-discrimination. See Case C-304/01, Spain v. Commission, EU:C:2004:495, 
paras 39-43.
76 See Case T-229/04, Sweden v. Commission, EU:T:2007:217, paras 83-88, and 102-10. The King-
dom of Sweden also argued that the European Commission, despite having taken into consideration other 
scientific studies relating to different effects of paraquat in the preparation of Commission Directive 
2003/112/EC, had breached certain procedural obligations. See Id. at 89-93, 111-26.
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that exposure to paraquat could have on humans.77 It also alleged that the decision 
had been based on dossiers that contained gaps concerning the harmful effects of 
paraquat on the health of specific animal species.78 The General Court accepted both 
claims and concluded that the scientific dossiers that the Commission had evaluated 
did not contain enough evidence to support the decisions taken and annulled Directive 
2003/112/EC.79
The question of which standard of compliance ought to prevail remains open. 
Unfortunately, in Case C-161/04, Austria v. Parliament and Council, the Republic 
of Austria withdrew its application almost six months after the publication of the 
Opinion of the AG and before the ECJ had the opportunity to issue a judgment on the 
matter. In addition, the decision of the General Court in Sweden v. Commission is the 
only precedent where the CJEU has applied the stricter standard to annul an act of an 
EU institution. We will need to wait for the CJEU to provide further clarification on 
which standard ought to prevail. Nevertheless, as I shall describe in Section IV, in 
policy areas where EU institutions enjoy ample discretion, such as monetary policy, 
the CJEU typically adopts a rather accommodating approach to the limits of that dis-
cretion. This would suggest that, in the specific case of the CSPP, the Court might be 
more inclined to adopt a lenient standard of compliance with Art. 11 TFEU.
In short, the ECB and the NCBs that comprise the Eurosystem are responsible for 
the design and implementation of monetary policy in the Eurozone and are therefore 
bound by the principle of integration laid down in Art. 11 TFEU. In light of the 
analysis presented above, the application of Art. 11 TFEU to the Eurosystem has 
implications at two levels. At a more substantive level, the principle of integration 
incorporates horizontal objectives of environmental protection into the mandates of 
the ECB and the NCBs that comprise the Eurosystem. Although the maintenance of 
price stability will remain their primary objective, they should be able to support 
environmental protection just as they support the general economic policies of the 
Union.80 At a more procedural level, it imposes an obligation on the Eurosystem to 
“take into account” those horizontal objectives of environmental protection when 
designing and implementing measures of monetary policy. The precise scope of this 
obligation will need to be determined based on the specific facts of the case; but, 
importantly, even under a more lenient approach, a complete disregard of environ-
mental protection concerns could serve as a standard for reviewing the validity of 
monetary policy measures.
77 See Id. at 139-55.
78 See Id. at 192-201.
79 See Id. at 172-86, 229-43.
80 See Arts. 119(2), 127(1) and 282(2) TFEU. In Gauweiler, the ECJ acknowledged the capacity 
of the ECB to integrate policy objectives other than those specific to monetary policy. In this particular 
case, the ECB had made the implementation of a specific programme of monetary policy conditional 
upon full compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment programmes that the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) had outlined for certain Mem-
ber States. See Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and others, EU:C:2015:400 (hereinafter, “Gauweiler”), paras 
57-59. 
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IV. The Validity of the CSPP: A Critical Assessment
In Section II, I described how purchasing bonds issued by non-financial corporations 
in the oil, gas and automotive industries under the CSPP would reduce the cost of 
finance for these corporations, effectively facilitating and prolonging their emission 
of greenhouse gases and aggravating climate change. This negative impact represents 
an evident conflict with the EU objective of ‘work[ing] for the sustainable develop-
ment of Europe’81 and with the more specific environmental objective of ‘preserving, 
protecting and improving the quality of the environment’.82 As such, it also represents 
a potential breach of the principle of integration. This section explores how a conflict 
between price stability and environmental protection might affect the validity of the 
CSPP.
When an EU institution faces two conflicting objectives, finding a balance between 
the two is an exercise of political discretion.83 That political discretion, however, is 
not unbounded. The exercise of that political discretion ‘is subject to a judicial review 
restricted to verifying that the measure in question is not vitiated by a manifest error 
or a misuse of powers and that the competent authority did not clearly exceed the 
bounds of its discretion’.84 Some of those bounds to political discretion include the 
principles of proportionality and non-discrimination.85 The principle of non-discrim-
ination is not directly relevant for the purposes of this essay.86 Thus, in the remainder 
of this section, I will focus my analysis on the principle of proportionality.
Proportionality is the cornerstone of principles of administrative legality in EU 
law.87 The principle is now consecrated in Art. 5(4) TEU, albeit in very general 
terms.88 In the absence of an explicit, detailed definition of this principle in the EU 
Treaties, it has been the task of the CJEU to provide such definition. It is clear from 
the case law of the CJEU that, in order to comply with the principle of proportional-
81 Art. 3(3) TEU.
82 Art. 191(1) TFEU.
83 See e.g. the Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-161/04, Austria v. Parliament and Council, 
EU:C:2006:66, para. 50.
84 Case T-141/00 (Joined Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00, 
T-141/00), Trenker v. Commission, EU:T:2002:283, para. 201, and the case law cited therein. See also 
the Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-304/01, Spain v. Commission, EU:C:2003:619, para. 59 and the 
caselaw cited therein.
85 See e.g. Case T-141/00, Trenker v. Commission, EU:T:2002:283, para. 186. In this case, the Gen-
eral Court also referred to the prevalence of the protection of human health and the environment over 
economic interests as another limitation of political discretion. The reference to “economic interests” is 
to those of individual market participants, e.g. pharmaceutical companies, not economic policy interests. 
86 The principle of non-discrimination would become a relevant limit to the exercise of political dis-
cretion if, for example, the CSPP Decision excluded specific issuers from the eligibility criteria under the 
CSPP based on the environmental impact of their activities. At the time of writing, that was not the case. 
87 For an extensive list of academic work exploring the importance of the principle of proportional-
ity in EU administrative law, see Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law, 590 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).
88 In particular, its first paragraph reads: ‘Under the principle of proportionality, the content and 
form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.’
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ity, a specific measure needs to meet, at least, two tests:89 first, the measure must be 
suitable or appropriate to achieve the objective pursued (the “suitability test”); and 
second, the measure must be necessary to achieve that objective, i.e. the competent 
authority could not have attained the same objective with less onerous measures (the 
“necessity test”).90
It is important to note, however, that when EU institutions exercise their discretion 
in a policy area that entails political, economic and social choices that require complex 
assessments, the CJEU has normally regarded the principle of proportionality as a 
rather lenient limit to that political discretion.91 Monetary policy is one of those areas. 
For example, in Gauweiler, the German Constitutional Court requested the ECJ to 
issue a preliminary ruling on the validity of a programme under which the ECB had 
expressed its intention to purchase government bonds on secondary markets (the 
“OMT programme”) as an exercise of its competence on monetary policy.92 Indeed, 
when examining the validity of the OMT programme, the ECJ, sitting in a Grand 
Chamber, acknowledged that the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)93 enjoys 
‘a broad discretion’ when designing and implementing monetary policy measures 
because ‘[it] is required […] to make choices of a technical nature and to undertake 
forecasts and complex assessments’.94 In Weiss, the ECJ, sitting in a Grand Chamber 
again, recently confirmed the ESCB’s broad discretion in the design and implementa-
tion of the PSPP.95
Nevertheless, in Gauweiler and Weiss, the ECJ also emphasized the fundamental 
importance of reviewing the ESCB’s compliance with certain procedural guarantees. 
In particular, ‘Those [procedural] guarantees include the obligation for the ESCB to 
examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the situation in question 
and to give an adequate statement of the reasons for its decisions.’96 According to the 
89 There has been greater uncertainty about the applicability of a third element: the proportionality 
stricto sensu, i.e. whether the burden imposed on an affected party is disproportionate to the desired 
objective. Craig suggests that the EU courts ‘will generally [make reference to this aspect of the pro-
portionality inquiry] when the applicant presents arguments directed specifically to it.’ Craig supra n 88 
at 592. For a thorough discussion, see Id. at 601-04.
90 See, for all, Case C-331/88, Fedesa and Others, EU:C:1990:391, para. 13; Case C-101/98, 
UDL, EU:C:1999:615, para. 30; and Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00, Omega Air and Others, 
EU:C:2002:161, para. 62.
91 See e.g. Case C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, 
EU:C:2002:741, para. 123. For a general analysis of the Court’s case law, see Craig supra n 88 at 
592-604.
92 For a detailed analysis of the decision, see Marco Lamandini, David Ramos and Javier Solana, 
The European Central Bank (ECB) as a Catalyst for Change in EU Law. Part 1: The ECB´s Mandates 
23 Columbia Journal of European Law 1, 6-19 (2016).
93 See supra n 2.
94 See Gauweiler, para. 68 and the caselaw cited therein.
95 See Case C-493/17, Weiss and others (hereinafter, “Weiss”), 11 December 2018, para. 24. Simi-
larly to Gauweiler, in Weiss, the German Constitutional Court sent a preliminary request to the ECJ 
regarding the potential violation of the prohibition of monetary financing in the context of the PSPP 
and the possibility of the PSPP being ultra vires.
96 Gauweiler, para. 69. See also Weiss, para. 30.
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ECJ, compliance with these procedural guarantees is essential ‘to enable the persons 
concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise 
its power of review’.97
Albeit a recent development in the case law of the CJEU, this view of procedural 
guarantees as solid limits to the exercise of political discretion in relation to the need 
to protect monetary and/or financial stability is not new. For example, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental nature 
of the right to a fair trial as a strict limit to that discretion.98 More recently, in the 
context of the resolution of Banco Popular, the Appeal Panel of the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB)99 has confirmed that the right of access to documents, another procedural 
guarantee, plays an instrumental role in the protection of the fundamental rights of 
investors affected by the implementation of the decision of the SRB to put Banco 
Popular into resolution.100
Like the procedural guarantees in all these cases, the procedural obligation under 
Art. 11 TFEU also plays an instrumental role to enable the CJEU to exercise its power 
of review. In particular, that procedural obligation has an instrumental value for the 
principle of proportionality. Under the necessity test, in the presence of two poten-
tially conflicting objectives, the analysis of the CJEU will revolve around the poten-
tial onerous impact of the controversial measure on one of the objectives; in this case, 
environmental protection. Only if the Eurosystem takes into account environmental 
objectives when designing and implementing the CSPP, and only if it includes those 
objectives expressly among the reasons for its decisions,101 will the CJEU be able to 
examine the necessity of the CSPP.102 Otherwise, it is impossible to determine what 
97 Gauweiler, para. 70. See also Weiss, para. 31.
98 See e.g. ECtHR, Credit and Industrial Bank v. the Czech Republic, Appl. No. 29010/95, judgment 
of 21 October 2003; and ECtHR, Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 49429/99, judgment of 24 
November 2005. For a detailed analysis of the potential role of due process rights as effective limits to 
political discretion in the context of banking and financial crises, see Ramos and Solana, Fundamental 
Rights: A Limit to Bail-In? (forthcoming 2019).
99 The SRB is the new EU bank resolution authority. Art. 85 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 (the “Single Resolution Mechanism 
Regulation”) requires the SRB to establish an Appeal Panel for the purposes of deciding on appeals 
against its decisions.
100 See the decisions of the Appeal Panel of the SRB in cases 38/17 to 43/17. These decisions are 
available at <https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/cases/tags/171>. For a detailed analysis of these decisions 
and their role as limits to political discretion in the context of banking and financial crises, see Ramos 
and Solana, Fundamental Rights: A Limit to Bail-In? (forthcoming 2019).
101 See supra n 97. See also Case T-141/00, Trenker v. Commission, EU:T:2002:283, para. 200 and 
the case law cited therein. More generally, Art. 41(2)(c) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights con-
secrates the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions as a fundamental principle 
to guarantee effective judicial protection.
102 The CJEU would probably be reluctant to examine the suitability of a controversial measure of 
monetary policy given the broad level of discretion that the Eurosystem enjoys when designing and 
implementing monetary policy. Indeed, in Gauweiler, for example, the ECJ did not question the ECB’s 
argument about the suitability of the OMT programme to safeguard the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism and the singleness of the monetary policy, the stated objectives of the OMT programme. See 
Gauweiler para. 72-80. Neither did the Court question the suitability of the PSPP in Weiss. See Weiss, 
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the Eurosystem knew or did not know about the environmental impact of the CSPP 
at the time of its design and implementation.
In Section III, I examined the standard of compliance with the procedural obliga-
tion contained in Art. 11 TFEU. Before assessing the circumstances of the CSPP, it 
is imperative to examine the standard that the ECJ will use to evaluate any reasons 
that the Eurosystem might have provided to justify the design and implementation of 
the programme.
In its recent judgment in Weiss, the ECJ had to examine whether the ECB had 
given an adequate statement of the reasons for its decision to launch the PSPP. In 
particular, the Court had to examine whether the Governing Council had considered 
the potential side effects of the PSPP, including its possible impact on the budgetary 
decisions of the Member States concerned. Expanding on Gauweiler,103 the Court 
analysed two aspects that might shed additional light on the validity of the CSPP 
under Art. 11 TFEU. First, the Court affirmed that, in the case of a measure intended 
to have general application, the relevant institutions only need to clarify the essential 
objective pursued, they do not need to provide a specific statement of reasons for each 
of the technical choices they make.104 Second, the Court specified that the assessment 
of an institution’s compliance with its duty to state reasons should not be constrained 
to the wording of the relevant measure but should also extend ‘to its context and to 
the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question’.105 In its judgment, 
the Court found several documents of relevance to determine whether the ECB had 
complied with its duty to state reasons: i) the decision of the Governing Council that 
established the PSPP and the subsequent decisions that amended it;106 ii) various 
paras 74-78. The court’s reluctance to question the ECB’s arguments may have also been grounded 
on the court’s lack of expertise to assess the relevant factors. See Gráinne de Búrca, The Principle of 
Proportionality and Its Application in EC Law 13 Yearbook of European Law 105, 111 (1993). The 
same lack of expertise may also discourage the court from examining the necessity of a controversial 
measure. Nevertheless, there are other factors that can influence the court’s approach to proportional-
ity, e.g. the importance of the interests at stake, that could prompt the Court to examine a controversial 
measure under the necessity test. See Id. In Gauweiler, the ECJ did scrutinise the OMT programme 
under the necessity test, but it concluded that the programme had not gone “manifestly beyond” what 
was necessary to achieve those objectives based on a questionable analysis of the programme’s limita-
tions. See Gauweiler, paras 81-90. For a critical analysis of the ECJ’s reasoning, see Lamandini, Ramos 
and Solana supra n 93 at 14-17. The OMT programme, however, did not confront two different policy 
objectives. In its preliminary questions, the German Constitutional Court asked the ECJ to determine 
(i) whether the OMT decision fell outside of the scope of the ECB’s monetary policy mandate (Arts. 
119 and 127 TFEU), and (ii) whether that decision violated the prohibition of monetary financing (Art. 
123 TFEU). See Gauweiler, para. 10.
103 In Gauweiler, there was no formal decision of the Governing Council to establish the OMT 
programme. The Court assessed whether the ECB had satisfied its obligation to provide a statement 
of reasons by examining the press release announcing the OMT programme and the draft legal acts 
considered during the meeting of the Governing Council at which that press release was approved. See 
Gauweiler, para. 71.
104 See Weiss, para. 32 and the caselaw cited therein.
105 See Id. at 33 and the caselaw cited therein.
106 See Id. at 34 and 35.
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documents published by the ECB at the time when each of those decisions was 
adopted, including ‘press releases, introductory statements of the President of the 
ECB at press conferences, accompanied by answers to the questions raised by the 
press, and by the accounts of the ECB Governing Council’s monetary policy meet-
ings, which outline the discussion within that body’;107 and iii) documents published 
by the ECB after the relevant decisions had been adopted which explored the effects 
of the APP and the PSPP, in particular, the ECB’s Economic Bulletin.108
On 9 July 2018, in a testimony before the European Parliament, Mr. Draghi 
acknowledged that the ECB had not taken into consideration the impact that the CSPP 
would have on climate change. In response to a question from MEP Neena Gill on 
whether the ECB had undertaken an ‘analysis of the climate impact of its quantitative 
easing programme’, Mr. Draghi responded: ‘To my knowledge, we don’t have an 
analysis of the impact of our programme or of climate change considerations in our 
programme, but I can certainly say that we will look into this and see what’s the 
effect.’109 The use of the future tense (‘we will look into this’) indicates that, at the 
time, the ECB had completely disregarded environmental protection when designing 
and implementing the CSPP. As I argued in Section III, under a lenient standard of 
compliance, the CJEU would stand ready to examine the validity of any decision that 
‘completely disregards’ environmental concerns.110 This would expose the ECB and 
the NCBs that comprise the Eurosystem to the risk of litigation.111
On 24 September 2018, in his next testimony before the European Parliament, Mr. 
Draghi announced for the first time, albeit without giving specific details, that the 
Eurosystem had purchased green bonds under the CSPP.112 The details came a few 
107 See Id. at 36-39. The Court considered that these documents ‘supplement[ed] the reasoning given 
in the decisions by setting out, in detail, the economic analyses underpinning the decisions, the various 
options considered by the Governing council and the reasons justifying the choices made, in the light, 
in particular, of the observed and anticipated effects of the PSPP’. Id. at 37. 
108 See Id. at 40.
109 (Emphasis added.) Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘Transcript of the Monetary 
Dialogue with Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Held on 9 July 2018’, p 18.
110 See supra n 76.
111 The judicial review of the CSPP raises many procedural questions, e.g. what the actual object 
of judicial review might be: the CSPP Decision or the acts of the purchasing NCBs that implement 
that Decision, including the reinvestment of the principal payments from maturing securities held in 
the CSPP portfolio; the application of any relevant procedural requirements such as time bars; juris-
diction; and, importantly, legal standing. A detailed analysis of these questions is beyond the scope 
of this essay. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, given the decentralised implementation of the 
CSPP, both the ECB and the NCBs within the Eurosystem, particularly those that are responsible for 
the implementation of the CSPP through market purchases, would, in principle, be vulnerable to litiga-
tion. Effectively, purchasing NCBs are acting as agents of the Eurosystem in the implementation of the 
monetary policy in the Eurozone. 
112 ‘But when we come to the actual action that the ECB has undertaken through its corporate bond 
purchase programme – and this is something that I have never had the opportunity to communicate 
before – the ECB has actually purchased a quite significant amount of green bonds.’ See Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘Transcript of the Monetary Dialogue with Mario Draghi, President 
of the ECB, Held on 24 September 2018’, p 16.
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weeks later. On 8 November 2018, coinciding with a speech on monetary policy and 
climate change that Mr Benoît Cœuré, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, 
was giving at a conference in the Deutsche Bundesbank,113 the ECB published a short 
piece in its Economic Bulletin detailing the amount of green bonds that the Eurosys-
tem had purchased under the APP, including the CSPP.114 The same piece argued that, 
since the announcement of the CSPP, the spreads of green corporate bonds had 
declined steadily and the volume of green bonds issued had risen.115 Causality, how-
ever, is far from clear.116
At first sight, in light of the analysis of the ECJ in Weiss, it would seem like the 
publication of the volume of green bonds purchased under the APP in the ECB Eco-
nomic Bulletin on 8 November 2018 would evidence that the Eurosystem has com-
plied with its procedural obligation under Art. 11 TFEU to take into account 
environmental protection objectives when designing and implementing monetary 
policy. There are several reasons why that may be a precipitate conclusion, however.
First, in Weiss, the ECJ concluded that the ECB had duly stated the reasons for the 
PSPP Decision after taking into consideration several factors together, including i) 
the PSPP decision and the subsequent decisions that amended it, ii) various documents 
published at the same time as the relevant decisions, and iii) documents published 
after the relevant decisions. The ECB Economic Bulletin was only one of several 
factors in the Court’s decision. Importantly, the relevant decisions themselves con-
tained information that illustrated the decision-making process of the Governing 
Council in relation to the issue that had given rise to the preliminary questions: the 
budgetary implications for Member States of establishing the PSPP. Moreover, they 
were supplemented by documents that were published at the same time as the relevant 
decisions.
In the case of the CSPP, neither the CSPP decisions nor the communications that 
followed the announcement of these decisions make any reference to environmental 
protection concerns. Mr Draghi himself acknowledged this in his testimony before 
the European Parliament on 9 July 2018. To date, the only express reference we have 
is the said ECB Economic Bulletin, which was published 20 months after the 
announcement of the CSPP.117 Whether the ECJ would rely on one disclosure made 
113 See Benoît Cœuré, supra n 14.
114 As of the end of August 2018, the Eurosystem held “green bonds” in its CSPP portfolio for an 
outstanding value of €6.2 billion. This amounts to, approximately, to 3.72% of the whole CSPP portfo-
lio. See Roberto A De Santis, Katja Hettler, Madelaine Roos and Fabio Tamburrini, Box 1 – Purchases 
of Green Bonds Under the Eurosystem’s Asset Purchase Programme 7 ECB Economic Bulletin 21, 
23 (2018). 
115 These effects mirror those observed for CSPP-eligible bonds more broadly. See Section II above. 
In particular, the ECB affirmed that the announcement of the CSPP ‘accounted for an average decline 
in spreads for eligible green bonds of 25 basis points’. Roberto A De Santis, Katja Hettler, Madelaine 
Roos and Fabio Tamburrini supra n 115 at 24.
116 For example, the increase in the volume of CSPP-eligible green bonds issued seems to be part 
of a broader global trend in the issuance of these bonds. See Id.
117 The ECB announced the CSPPP on 10 March 2016 and published the data on green bonds under 
the CSPP portfolio on 8 November 2018. Since their publication, ECB representatives have referred to 
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20 months after the announcement of the relevant measure (CSPP) to conclude that 
the Eurosystem had discharged its procedural obligation under Art. 11 TFEU is open 
to question.118 A priori, the absence of any justification in the CSPP decisions, in the 
minutes of the meetings where the Governing Council (or the competent bodies of 
the NCBs) discussed the design and implementation of the programme, or in the com-
munications surrounding the announcement of those decisions, would lead to the 
conclusion that environmental protection was not taken into consideration: at a fun-
damental level, justifying the necessity of a measure requires any relevant competent 
authority to understand its potential onerous effects before its adoption.
Second, as we shall see in the next section, the definitional problems that currently 
surround “green bonds” and similar “green” financial assets,119 particularly in relation 
to their environmental impact, cast doubt on their suitability to adequately reflect 
environmental protection concerns as required by Art. 11 TFEU.120 For example, 
according to the said ECB Economic Bulletin, some of the most carbon-intensive 
sectors, such as utilities, infrastructure, transportation and construction, account for 
94% of the CSPP-eligible green bond issuance.121 These four sectors also happen to 
be the most widely represented in the CSPP portfolio.122 This would suggest that the 
presence of green bonds in the CSPP portfolio does not respond to a conscious deci-
sion by the Eurosystem. Rather, it is a coincidence that results from the (perhaps 
unsurprising) irony that the largest emitters of greenhouse gases are also the largest 
issuers of “green” bonds.
Lastly, as I argued in Section III, whether the ECJ will subject the Eurosystem to 
a lenient or a strict standard of compliance with the procedural obligation laid down 
in Art. 11 TFEU is open to question. While the data published in the ECB Economic 
Bulletin (namely, the total holdings of green bonds under the CSPP portfolio and the 
apparent123 effect of the CSPP on the issuance and spreads of green bonds) might 
satisfy the more lenient standard, but it does not reflect an active engagement with 
environmental protection, as required under the strict standard. Given the bias of the 
CSPP portfolio towards carbon intensive sectors,124 an active engagement would 
these data in a few occasions. See e.g. Benoît Cœuré, supra n 14; Committee on Economic and Mon-
etary Affairs, ‘Transcript of the Monetary Dialogue with Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Held on 
26 November 2018’, p 8.
118 In addition, it is important to note that there are serious doubts about the causal effect of the 
CSPP on green bond spreads that the Eurosystem proclaims. See supra n 117.
119 See infra n 137.
120 In the said Economic Bulletin, the ECB defines “green bonds” as ‘debt securities whose proceeds 
are used to finance investment projects with an environmental benefit’. See Roberto A De Santis, Katja 
Hettler, Madelaine Roos and Fabio Tamburrini, supra n 115 at 21.
121 According to Eurostat data, these four sectors accounted for 67% of total greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the EU in 2015. See Id. at 23.
122 See Matikainen, Campiglio and Zenghelis, supra n 9.
123 See supra n 117.
124 See the analysis at the end of Section II.
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require, at least, an express acknowledgement of such bias. The ECB has made no 
such acknowledgement to date.125
The analysis in Sections III and IV confirms that the principle of integration laid 
down in Art. 11 TFEU puts environmental protection concerns among the ‘relevant 
elements’ that the Eurosystem must ‘examine carefully and impartially’, in the words 
of the ECJ, when designing and implementing new measures of monetary policy.126 
Whether the Eurosystem has discharged that obligation when designing and imple-
menting the CSPP is open to interpretation. It is important to note, however, that even 
if the Eurosystem were required to go beyond the disclosure of the volume of green 
bonds that it holds in its CSPP portfolio to comply with Art. 11 TFEU, that may not 
lead the Eurosystem to change the design or the implementation of the CSPP.127 That 
will remain an exercise of political discretion. Nevertheless, the importance of this 
procedural obligation must not be underestimated. By introducing empirical research 
on the environmental impact of monetary policy into the decision-making process of 
the Eurosystem, the principle of integration can raise awareness of the need to pro-
mote environmental protection among central bankers.128 In so doing, the principle 
of integration would make a negative environmental impact of monetary policy more 
difficult to justify. Moreover, in addition to facilitating judicial review by the CJEU, 
the obligation of the Eurosystem to justify how it has taken into account environmen-
tal protection in the design and implementation of its monetary policy would facilitate 
political accountability129 and the examination of any potential liability.130 Together, 
all these factors create an opportunity for political change within the Eurosystem.
125 The ECB regularly publishes data on the composition of the CSPP portfolio which identifies the 
issuer of purchased securities but it does not identify the volume of bonds that the Eurosystem holds 
from each issuer. Academic researchers have made estimations of such bias. See supra n 50.
126 See Gauweiler, para. 69.
127 Particularly if the CJEU continues to regard the principle of proportionality as a rather lenient 
limit to political discretion in the context of monetary policy. See supra nn. 95 and 96. Wasmeier, 
however, has argued that the necessity of a controversial measure which leads to greater environmen-
tal degradation ‘is conceivable only in exceptional situations and only on a temporary basis’. In the 
absence of such an exceptional justification, he advocates for a neutral approach that gives preference 
to an interpretation of EU law that has ‘useful, or at least no harmful, effects on the environment’. See 
Wasmeier supra n 60 at 163. Whether environmental protection concerns could make the CJEU change 
its approach to proportionality as a rather lenient limit to political discretion in the context of monetary 
policy is still an open question.
128 In recent years, central bankers have become increasingly aware of their potential role in envi-
ronmental protection. See e.g. Banque de France, First Meeting of the Central Banks and Supervisors 
Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) on January 24th in Paris <https://www.banque-
france.fr/en/communique-de-presse/first-meeting-central-banks-and-supervisors-network-greening-finan-
cial-system-ngfs-january-24th> (accessed 15 April 2019).
129 For example, in the Monetary Dialogues with the European Parliament. Although MEPs do not 
feel that Monetary Dialogues made a big difference in the management of the euro crisis, they do feel 
that Monetary Dialogues informed and engaged them and their constituencies in debates of monetary 
policy. See Stefan Collignon and Sebastian Diessner, The ECB’s Monetary Dialogue with the European 
Parliament: Efficiency and Accountability During the Euro Crisis? 54 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 1296 (2016).
130 For example, non-contractual liability pursuant to Arts. 268 and 340.3° TFEU. 
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At a time when the political momentum for more sustainable financial markets is 
growing,131 a direct channel to the Eurosystem’s decision-making process offers some 
room for optimism. Although the scepticism about the capacity of the APP to promote 
economic growth might cast doubt on the capacity of a more proactive APP to sup-
port sustainable development,132 a more neutral approach that reduces the positive 
impact on the financing conditions of polluting industries would be an important step 
towards a more sustainable future.133 Moreover, the integration of environmental 
protection concerns into the design and implementation of monetary policy could lead 
the Eurosystem to adopt a more proactive approach in other policies that have a 
greater potential to promote sustainable finance.134 For that, the principle of integra-
tion should be praised.
Nevertheless, our understanding of the potential impact of monetary policy on 
climate change is still embryonic.135 In this sense, compliance with Art. 11 TFEU is 
not an easy task for the Eurosystem. In the next Section, I will explore how the Euro-
system might, in practice, take into account environmental protection in the CSPP, 
and I will also examine the possible implications of such compliance for the Euro-
system’s monetary policy more broadly.
V. Taking Environmental Protection into Account: Policy Implications
At first sight, perhaps the most evident way for the Eurosystem to take into account 
horizontal objectives of environmental protection when designing the CSPP would 
be to expressly include “green assets” within the list of eligible assets under the pro-
131 For example, the European Commission has expressed a strong commitment to developing more 
sustainable financial markets with the recent publication of its Action Plan on Sustainable Finance. 
See European Commission, ‘Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth’ COM(2018) 97 final (2018). 
132 The evidence on the broader impact of the APP on economic growth is inconclusive. See supra 
n 33. Moreover, the positive impact of the CSPP on the financing conditions of non-financial corpora-
tions did not have a direct effect on the real economy. For example, in Spain, the funds that non-financial 
corporations raised in the favourable conditions of corporate bond markets after the announcement of 
the CSPP were not used to finance real investments but rather to modify the structure of their liabilities. 
See Arce, Gimeno and Mayordomo supra n 35 at 3. Allegedly, however, the CSPP did have an indi-
rect effect on the real economy by increasing aggregate bank lending, which seemed to finance more 
real investments, although this indirect effect seems to have resulted from the combination of different 
measures of monetary policy, including TLTROs. See Id. at 4-5. 
133 Any reduction in the positive effects of the CSPP on the financing conditions of polluting com-
panies, albeit apparently small, could complement other initiatives that may be better placed to funnel 
capital flows to support sustainable projects. An effective and successful transition to a low-carbon 
economy will be the result of many cumulative effects.
134 For example, “green credit allocation” polices that would guide lending and investment to fos-
ter the development of prioritised sectors and markets. See Josh Ryan-Collins and Frank Van Lerven 
supra n 9 at 10-11.
135 For examples of early attempts, see Matikainen, Campiglio and Zenghelis supra n 9; McKibbin 
and others supra n 9. 
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gramme. Yet, in addition to a series of practical problems,136 making an express ref-
erence to the eligibility of green assets under the programme would not demonstrate 
that horizontal objectives of environmental protection have been taken into account 
in the design and implementation of the CSPP, as required under Art. 11 TFEU. The 
sheer eligibility of green financial assets tells us nothing about the necessity to pur-
chase assets from corporations that contribute to the emission of greenhouse gases, 
for example.
A direct exclusion of “brown assets” from the list of eligible assets under the CSPP 
could provide clearer evidence that the Eurosystem has taken environmental protec-
tion into account in its decision-making process, but it would face even more acute 
practical problems than the inclusion of green assets.137 More importantly, however, 
a strict exclusion of brown assets from the CSPP could effectively make environmen-
tal protection the primary objective of monetary policy in the Eurozone, trumping 
price stability.138 That is not the function of the principle of integration,139 and such 
an outcome would clearly be contrary to the EU Treaties.140
A more effective way of taking these horizontal objectives into account would be 
to include them within other eligibility criteria of the CSPP. For example, the General 
Council of the ECB could introduce environmental concerns into the credit quality 
requirements that any marketable debt instrument must meet in order to be eligible 
under the Eurosystem monetary policy framework.141
136 For example, there is considerable scepticism about the standards of green finance products at 
the moment. That is one of the reasons why the European Commission has made the development of a 
“green taxonomy” one of its priorities. See European Commission, supra n 132 at 4-5. For an overview 
of practical problems, see Emanuele Campiglio and others, Climate Change Challenges for Central 
Banks and Financial Regulators 8 Nature Climate Change 462, 465 (2018).
137 Unlike the case of a green taxonomy, the European Commission has not expressed its intention 
to develop a taxonomy of brown assets. A “brown taxonomy” was not present either in the final report 
that the High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (HLEG) prepared to inform the Commis-
sion’s Action Plan. See High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, ‘Financing a Sustainable 
European Economy (Final Report 2018)’ (2018). Moreover, unlike with “green” financial assets, there 
seem to be no noticeable private initiatives aiming to develop classifications of brown financial assets. 
In addition, whether it is issuer- or issue-focused, a “brown taxonomy” may fail to capture the diversity 
of projects for which a polluting company may decide to raise funds in the bond market, which may 
include projects that aim to smooth the transition to a low-carbon economy. Indeed, according to the 
ECB, 94% of green bonds held in the CSPP portfolio have been issued by some the largest emitters of 
greenhouse gases in the EU. See supra n 122.
138 If a direct exclusion of brown assets led to only green assets being eligible, this could com-
promise the effectiveness of monetary policy. As of 31st December 2018, the total volume of green 
bonds issued in Europe since 2007 within the last eight years (approximately €168 billion) was lower 
than the total volume of purchases under the CSPP (€178 billion). See Climate Bond Initiative, ‘Green 
bonds: The state of the market 2018’ (2019), p 5. In addition, restricting eligibility to such a small pool 
of assets would significantly reduce the possibilities of diversification, thereby increasing the financial 
risk of the CSPP portfolio. 
139 See the analysis in Section III.
140 Art. 127(1) TFEU clearly makes price stability the primary objective of the ESCB.
141 See Arts. 71 and 82 to 88 of the General Documentation Guideline. These credit quality require-
ments also determine the eligibility of assets under the CSPP. See Art. 2 CSPP Decision. Changing the 
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Climate risks can have a direct impact on the credit risk of companies in carbon-
intensive sectors. For example, the transition to a low-carbon economy poses a seri-
ous challenge to the long-term viability of these companies.142 Their inability to ensure 
their long-term viability could potentially increase the default risk of their existing 
long-term debt products. In addition, the inability of these companies to ensure the 
sustainability of their operations in the long-term might hinder their ability to raise 
new long-term finance today. If the sense of urgency to transition to a low-carbon 
economy were to increase, a sudden, widespread and uncoordinated attempt from 
investors to divest in these companies could cause the prices of their assets to depre-
ciate abruptly, putting these companies into serious financial difficulties.143 While 
such a virulent reaction could potentially alleviate climate concerns it could have a 
serious effect on financial stability.144 Together, all these factors make the connection 
between climate risk and credit risk highly relevant.145
credit quality requirements regulated in the General Documentation Guideline would have an impact 
on other monetary policy measures apart from the CSPP.
142 A transition to a low-carbon economy could leave a large proportion of the world’s proven 
reserves of oil, gas and coal “stranded”, i.e. ‘literally unburnable without expensive carbon capture 
technology’. Mark Carney, Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – Climate Change and Financial 
Stability (29 September 2015) <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2015/breaking-the-tragedy-of-
the-horizon-climate-change-and-financial-stability> (accessed 15 April 2019). Unless companies that are 
currently exploiting these resources are able to design and implement a sustainable business plan in a 
low-carbon economy, their long-term viability will be seriously compromised. 
143 A direct exclusion of “brown assets” from the list of eligible assets under the CSPP, as discussed 
earlier in this Section, could further aggravate the impact of transition risks on financial stability if such 
exclusion were to act as a “wake up call” for investors, who might interpret the central bank’s decision 
as a sign of the need for a swift transition.
144 In this sense, ‘success is failure[:] too rapid a movement towards a low-carbon economy could 
materially damage financial stability’. Mark Carney, A Transition in Thinking and Action (Speech) 
(6 April 2018) <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/mark-carney-speech-at-international-
climate-risk-conference-for-supervisors> (accessed 15 April 2019). Carbon intensive businesses risk 
facing considerable losses because their activities and market value are still partly dependent on the 
assumption that stranded assets will be extracted. Market participants’ inability to price-in the risk of 
these stranded assets remaining in the ground may result in over-valuations of these companies, i.e. a 
“carbon bubble”. See Josh Ryan-Collins and Frank Van Lerven, supra n 9 at 6, 10. According to Mr 
Carney, companies in the natural resource and extraction sectors account for around one third of equity 
and fixed income assets globally. See Mark Carney, supra n 143 at 11. Given the relatively large pres-
ence of these businesses in financial markets, the exposure of investors to those losses, including insur-
ance companies, is ‘potentially huge’. Id.
145 Some central banks and financial supervisory authorities have started considering the idea of 
developing “climate stress tests” to better understand the potential impact of climate change on credit 
risk and financial stability more broadly. See e.g. Joint Committee of the European supervisory Authori-
ties, Joint Committee Report on Risks and Vulnerabilities in the EU Financial System, JC 2018 07 15 
(2018); Leslie Hook, ‘Central Bank Chiefs Sound Warning on Climate Change’ Financial Times (9 April 
2018). Mr Draghi himself has welcomed the pricing and supervision of climate-related risk. See Com-
mittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, ‘Transcript of the Monetary Dialogue with Mario Draghi, 
President of the ECB, Held on 26 February 2018’, p 15. For an early attempt to define a climate stress 
test methodology, see Stefano Battiston and others, A Climate Stress-Test of the Financial System 7 
Nature Climate Change 283 (2017).
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The rules applicable to the assessment of the credit quality of eligible assets are 
included in the Eurosystem credit assessment framework (ECAF), which is laid down 
in Arts 119 to 126 of the General Documentation Guideline. According to Arts 59(5) 
and 119(1), there are four accepted credit assessment sources: i) external credit assess-
ment institutions (ECAIs), i.e. ‘credit rating agencies whose ratings are considered 
suitable by the Eurosystem for the specific purpose of its monetary policy operations’;146 
ii) NCBs’ in-house credit assessment systems (ICASs),147 counterparties’ internal 
rating-based (IRB) systems,148 and third-party rating tool (RT) providers.149
According to Art. 82(1)(a) of the General Documentation Guideline:
With the exception of [asset-backed securities], all marketable assets must have 
a credit assessment provided by at least one accepted ECAI system, expressed in 
the form of a public credit rating, in compliance with, as a minimum, credit qual-
ity step 3 in the Eurosystem’s harmonised rating scale.150
Moreover, according to Article 84 of the General Documentation Guideline, if there 
are multiple ratings, the Eurosystem will only take into account the first-best.
According to Matikainen et al, at the end of May 2017, two of the four ECAIs were 
beginning to incorporate climate risk into their credit assessments.151 At the time of 
writing, however, the development of comprehensive and reliable assessments still 
remained a challenge.152 If credit quality requirements under the General Documenta-
tion Guideline were to reflect the exposure of issuers to transition risks and other 
climate risks, we might see the credit ratings of certain eligible assets being down-
graded, which could, eventually, translate into their ineligibility under the Eurosystem 
monetary policy framework, including the CSPP. More importantly for our purposes, 
however, if the Eurosystem were to use climate-sensitive credit assessment informa-
146 European Central Bank, Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework (ECAF) <https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/paym/coll/risk/ecaf/html/index.en.html> (accessed 15 April 2019). At the time of writing, 
there were four accepted ECAIs: DBRS, FitchRatings, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
147 For a detailed list of accepted ICASs, see Id..
148 IRB systems are excluded from the CSPP, however. See Art. 2(3) CSPP Decision.
149 For a detailed list of accepted RTs, see European Central Bank, supra n 147.
150 The Eurosystem harmonised rating scale is a mapping exercise that the Eurosystem does in 
order to ensure the comparability of the individual rating scales and grades used by each ECAI. For an 
updated version of the scale, see Id.
151 See Matikainen, Campiglio and Zenghelis, supra n 9 at 20. In parallel to the incorporation of 
climate risks to their credit risk assessment methodologies, credit rating agencies are being called upon 
to take into account environmental, social and governance considerations. See European Commission, 
supra n 132 at 7-8. In China, financial regulators are also encouraging banks and other financial insti-
tutions to incorporate environmental risks into their credit risk assessments. See e.g. People’s Bank of 
China and others, Guidelines for Establishing the Green Financial System <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/
english/130721/3133045/index.html> (accessed 15 April 2019).
152 See Campiglio and others, supra n 137 at 466-67. This also hinders financial supervision. See 
Frank Elderson, From Mission to Supervision: Putting Sustainable Prosperity on the Agenda of the 
Dutch Central Bank <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/from-mission-to-supervision-put
ting-sustainable-prosperity-on-the-agenda-of-the-dutch-central-bank/> (accessed 15 April 2019).
JAVIER SOLANA574
tion, it would be effectively taking into account the environmental impact of eligible 
assets as reflected in the relevant credit ratings and, thus, ensuring, in principle, its 
compliance with the procedural obligation laid down in Art. 11 TFEU.
In order to monitor climate-sensitive credit assessment information produced by 
the accepted ECAIs,153 the Eurosystem will need to acquire the relevant expertise and 
to develop an adequate methodology to assess the impact that climate risks can have 
on credit risk. This will inevitably require a considerable investment in time and 
financial resources. Nevertheless, developing that expertise presents important econ-
omies of scope that could make it a very attractive investment for the Eurosystem. In 
particular, if climate risks can aggravate the credit risk of assets held in the Eurosys-
tem balance sheet, that internal expertise could support the Eurosystem in the con-
sideration of applying a series of risk control measures to minimise the financial risk 
of its monetary policy operations.154 For example, that internal expertise could sup-
port the Eurosystem in the consideration of marking down the valuation of down-
graded assets,155 introducing limits in relation to issuers, debtors and guarantors of 
eligible assets that are particularly vulnerable to climate risks,156 or introducing 
supplementary haircuts to reflect the vulnerability of specific assets to climate risks 
(“climate haircuts”).157 Given the size of the current CSPP portfolio, diligence would 
dictate that the ECB starts taking these risks into consideration today.
In recent years, some central banks, particularly in developing economies, have 
started to use their policy tools to support environmental protection.158 Building on 
these pioneering experiences, there have been several proposals for the ECB and other 
central banks in developed economies to take a more proactive role in the fight against 
climate change.159 In addition to ensuring the validity of current and future monetary 
153 See e.g. Art. 129, paras (3) and (5) General Documentation Guideline.
154 If ECAIs incorporate transition risks and other climate-related risks into their credit assessment 
methodologies, potential downgrades in credit ratings could have a direct effect on valuation haircuts 
for marketable assets. See Arts. 128(1)(a) and 130(1)(c) General Documentation Guideline. Neverthe-
less, because the ECAIs methodology is still under-developed, the Eurosystem may want to consider 
the adoption of additional risk control measures. See also Art. 4(2) CSPP Decision.
155 See Art. 128(1)(d) General Documentation Guideline.
156 See e.g. Arts. 128(2) and 129(2)(b) General Documentation Guideline.
157 See Arts. 128(2) and 129(2)(c) General Documentation Guideline.
158 The primary response from central banks to address the impact of climate risks on financial stabil-
ity has been to encourage companies and financial institutions to disclose their exposure to those climate 
risks on a voluntary basis. See Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, ‘Final Report: 
Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures’ (2017). Nevertheless, 
central banks in certain developing countries are being particularly active, using, for example, reserve 
requirements, differentiated capital requirements and even softer guidance to incentivise bank lending 
to low-carbon projects. See Campiglio, supra n 9 at 226. For a comprehensive overview of these and 
other “green” central banking initiatives, see Frank Van Lerven, Green Central Banking in Emerging 
Market and Developing Country Economies (2017).
159 Some of these proposals include the use of macroprudential policy tools to disincentivise loans 
carrying carbon-risk or to encourage low-carbon investments, the use of credit allocation policies to 
guide lending and investment towards prioritised low-carbon sectors, or the redesign of central banks’ 
unconventional monetary policy measures to increase the proportion of green assets on their balance 
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policy measures and protecting its own balance sheet, developing the necessary exper-
tise to understand the relationship between climate change and credit risk could help 
the Eurosystem evaluate some of these proposals more confidently, e.g. using capital 
requirements to discourage loans carrying carbon risk.160 And perhaps more impor-
tantly, developing that expertise would allow the Eurosystem to contribute to improv-
ing our embryonic understanding of the relationship between climate change and 
credit risk and of the impact of monetary policy on climate change.
VI. Conclusion
The principle of integration laid down in Art. 11 TFEU imposes a procedural obliga-
tion on the ESCB to take into account horizontal objectives of environmental protec-
tion when designing and implementing the policy measures that aim at its primary 
objective of price stability. In the specific context of the monetary policy of the Euro-
zone, that obligation binds the ECB and the NCBs that comprise the Eurosystem. A 
recent testimony by Mr Draghi before the European Parliament suggests that, so far, 
the Eurosystem has failed to comply with this obligation. This exposes the ECB and 
the relevant NCBs to the risk of litigation, which could seek to challenge the validity 
of the CSPP and could undermine the effectiveness of the programme. Other measures 
of monetary policy could attract similar legal actions.
But regarding that principle of integration only as a source of procedural obliga-
tions is to undermine its potential to contribute to the fight against climate change. In 
addition to avoiding potential litigation, taking into account environmental protection 
in the design and implementation of monetary policy measures such as the CSPP 
could raise awareness among central bankers about the environmental impact of 
monetary policy. Such awareness could lead to a political change that could prompt 
the Eurosystem to take a more proactive role in promoting environmental protection 
and supporting on-going efforts to develop more sustainable financial markets. Impor-
tantly, at a substantive level, Art. 11 TFEU integrates these objectives into the man-
date of the ESCB, thereby conferring upon its members the legitimacy they would 
require to adopt such proactive roles.
sheets. For an overview of these policy recommendations, see Josh Ryan-Collins and Frank Van Lerven, 
supra n 9 at 9-12. See also Matikainen, Campiglio and Zenghelis, supra n 9 at 19-23. 
160 Regulatory capital requirements aim to improve the solvency of banks. They are determined on 
the basis of the credit risk of banks’ assets. For an overview of some of the challenges that climate-
aligned financial regulation would face, see Campiglio and others, supra n 137 at 464-65.
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